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The paper de￿nes ￿nancial development within an exchange economy with human-
capital based growth and with investment included in the exchange constraint. It
brings microeconomic theory and evidence in the ￿nance sector to bear upon how
in￿ ation and ￿nancial development a⁄ect the economy, and interact with each
other. This provides a perspective for interpreting related econometric evidence
in unison, rather than treating each part in isolation. It shows how far a neo-
classical theory can go in unifying the explanation of diverse phenomena, with its
limitations providing a basis for further developing the theory of this interaction.
The model is consistent with ten distinct strands of empirical evidence, and
explains these in a cohesive way. The ￿rst set of ￿ve concerns in￿ ation, invest-
ment and ￿nancial development. 1) A negative e⁄ect of in￿ ation on investment
has been found empirically for example by Madsen (2003), for panel OECD data.
By including investment in the exchange constraint (Stockman 1981), the model
shows that in￿ ation causes investment to decrease, and to decrease at a nonlinear
diminishing rate as the in￿ ation rate rises.1 2) Khan, Senhadji, and Smith (2006),
Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001), and Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) show how
in￿ ation decreases measures of ￿nancial depth that are related to investment,2
and that this e⁄ect is to some extent of diminishing magnitude as the in￿ ation
rate rises. The model gives this result by assuming that all saving and investment
is costlessly intermediated; this makes the degree of such intertemporal ￿nancial
intermediation, which is consistent with what is called "￿nancial depth", directly
linked to the amount of investment. In￿ ation negatively e⁄ects ￿nancial depth
as it a⁄ects investment, at a diminishing rate. 3) At the same time, Aiyagari,
Braun, and Eckstein (1998) show empirically that the ￿nance sector increases in
1And given the well-known link between in￿ ation rate levels and in￿ ation uncertainty levels,
also relevant is Byrne and Davis (2004), who ￿nds US evidence in support of a negative e⁄ect
on in￿ ation uncertainty on investment.
2In Boyd et al (2001), for example, in￿ ation decreases the quantity of loans that the ￿nancial
sector provides to the private sector.
1size as in￿ ation increases. The model shows this by assuming a costly production
of exchange credit, as in Aiyagari et al, whereby the agent chooses more exchange
credit to avoid a rising in￿ ation rate. 4) Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) shows
how ￿nancial development can increase growth. The model produces through an
increase in the productivity of the exchange credit production causing unambigu-
ously a higher balanced-path growth rate. 5) Evidence has shown mixed e⁄ects
of the interaction of in￿ ation and ￿nancial development on growth, such as in
Rousseau and Wachtel (2002)3. The model shows conditions under which this
interaction can produce di⁄erent e⁄ects on growth, based on a categorization of
channels as in Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005).
A second set of ￿ve facts concern the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on other variables.
6) In￿ ation in itself has been found by many to decrease growth (Barro 1995),
and again this is a nonlinear e⁄ect, occuring at a decreasing rate as the in￿ ation
rate rises (see Ghosh and Phillips 1998, Judson and Orphanides 1999, Gillman,
Harris, and MÆtyÆs 2004). The model produces this when an in￿ ation increase
causes goods to leisure substitution, at a decreasing rate, that lowers the capacity
utilization rate of human capital, the return to human capital, and so the growth
rate, at a decreasing rate.4 7) In￿ ation has also been found to be cointegrated
with the unemployment rate, in the US by Ireland (1999) and in the UK by
Shadman-Mehta (2001), with the latter ￿nding Granger causality from in￿ ation to
unemployment. While strictly the model has only a rate of productively employed
time and a leisure rate ("unproductive time"), empirically the movement in the
employment rate and the unemployment tends to be highly negatively correlated.
Therefore the model￿ s in￿ ation-induced decrease in leisure yields a decrease in
the rate of productively employed time that is consistent with this cointegration
evidence, and its causality. 8) Empirical evidence shows a positive Tobin (1965)
e⁄ect of in￿ ation decreasing the return to capital (Rapach 2003), and increasing
3See Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) for the e⁄ect of the interaction of ￿nancial
development with initial income, on growth.
4Insigni￿cant but positive empirical e⁄ects of in￿ ation on growth, for low in￿ ation rates, are
not robust to using instrumental variables to control for endogeneity; see Gillman et al (2004).
2the capital to e⁄ective labor ratio across sectors (Gillman and Nakov 2003). The
model produces this when in￿ ation-induced substitution towards leisure causes an
increase in the real wage and decrease in the return to human capital, thereby
inducing substitution from expensive labor to less expensive capital, even while the
investment rate decreases.5 9) Evidence supports a Cagan (1956) type of money
demand that has a rising magnitude of the interest elasticity as the in￿ ation rate
rises (Mark and Sul 2003). The model￿ s money demand is a general equilibrium
version of such a rising interest elasticity model (Gillman and Otto 2007) 10) The
production of ￿nancial intermediary services has been found empirically to exhibit
constant returns to scale in the three factors of labor, capital, and deposited funds.
The model uses this same CRS speci￿cation for exchange credit production, and
so is consistent with this evidence.
There are two main extensions of the model from Gillman and Kejak (2005)
that enable our results (while keeping the money demand functional form the
same). First we include investment in the exchange constraint, so that the in￿ ation
tax falls on investment as well as on consumption (Stockman 1981). This is
important because it results in a negative e⁄ect of in￿ ation on investment, even
while maintaining key Tobin (1965) e⁄ects. Second, we decentralize the ￿nance
sector in order to de￿ne its development in a standard fashion using parameters
of the production function.
The equilibrium is presented in Section 2 and developed through propositions
related to a closed form solution, and through simulations of the full model; these
results are used to explain the evidence. It is established how ￿nancial develop-
ment a⁄ects the marginal cost per unit of credit (Section 3.1), the average cost of
credit (Section 3.2) and the growth rate (Section 3.3). Simulations show the e⁄ects
of in￿ ation and ￿nancial development on investment, growth and other variables
(Section 4). The Discussion (Section 5) explains how the model￿ s simultaneous
results provide a interpretation of related econometric ￿ndings.
5In contrast, this investment rate increases with in￿ ation theoretically in Gillman and Kejak
(2005) and empirically in Ahmed and Rogers (2000).
32. Representative Agent Model
2.1. Consumer Problem
The representative agent￿ s discounted utility stream depends on the consumption







(logct + ￿logxt): (2.1)
Exchange is required for both consumption and investment goods, denoted by
it; whereby the consumer uses either nominal money, Mt; or credit from the credit
card. Let qt denote the real quantity of credit, and Pt denote the nominal goods
price. This makes the exchange constraint:
Mt + Ptqt ￿ Ptct + Ptit: (2.2)
It is assumed that all expenditures are sourced from deposits, denoted by dt;
held at the ￿nancial intermediary. The consumer buy shares in the intermediary
by making a deposit, whereby the price per share is given by the intermediary at a
￿xed price of one, so there is no possibility of a capital gain. However the share, or
unit deposit, yields a dividend that is paid by the intermediary to the consumer, so
that the intermediary has no remaining pro￿ts after the dividend distribution; the
intermediary is a "mutual bank" owned by the consumer. The per unit dividend
is in essence the payment of a nominal interest rate on deposited funds. Denote
the per unit nominal dividend as Rqt; total dividends are then Rqtdt:
Since all expenditures come out of the deposits, this means that
Ptdt = Pt (ct + it): (2.3)
The fractions of capital allocated across the three sectors, of goods (G), human
capital (H) and credit (Q), add up to 1:
1 = sGt + sHt + sQt; (2.4)
4the fractions of labor add up to the total productively utilized time, or 1 ￿ xt :
1 ￿ xt = lGt + lHt + lQt: (2.5)
Physical capital, kt; changes according to
kt+1 = it + (1 ￿ ￿K)kt: (2.6)
Human capital, ht; is accumulated through a CRS production function using ef-
fective labor and capital; with AH > 0;and ￿ 2 [0;1];
ht+1 = AH (sHtkt)
1￿￿ (lHtht)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿H)ht: (2.7)
Using the time and goods constraints, equations (2.4) and (2.5) to substitute in
for lHt and sHt;
ht+1 = AH[(1 ￿ sGt ￿ sQt)kt]
1￿￿[(1 ￿ lGt ￿ lQt ￿ xt)ht]
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿H)ht: (2.8)
The change in the nominal money stock, Mt+1 ￿Mt; is equal to income minus
expenditure. The nominal income received from capital and labor, with Pt de-
noting the price of goods, and rt and wt denoting the real rental and wage rates,
is Ptrt(sGt + sQt)kt and Ptwt(lGt + lQt)ht: Also there is a lump sum government
transfer Vt; and the dividend distribution from the intermediary of Rqtdt. Expen-
ditures are on consumption and investment, Pt (ct + it); and for the payment of
the fee for credit services; with Pqt denoting the nominal price per unit of credit,
this fee is Pqtqt: Together these items make the income constraint:
Mt+1 = Mt + Ptrt (sGt + sQt)kt + Ptwt (lGt + lQt)ht + Vt + Rqtdt (2.9)
￿Ptct ￿ Pt [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿K)kt] ￿ Pqtqt:
During the subperiod in which trading for goods takes place, the consumer
uses the credit card from the ￿nancial intermediary for the credit purchases, and
withdraws the cash (or equivalently uses a debit card to transfer the cash), at the
point of purchase.
52.2. Financial Intermediary Problem
The intermediary is assumed to operate competitively. It sets the price of deposits,
and then the consumer determines the quantity of deposits it wants to hold, dt;
as with a mutual bank. The production function for credit services is CRS in
e⁄ective labor, capital and the deposited funds dt: With AQ 2 (0;1); ￿1 2 [0;1];
￿2 2 [0;1]; and assuming that ￿1 + ￿2 ￿ 1; the production is given by
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For ￿1 = 0:15, ￿2 = 0:15; and AQ = 0:62, Figure 1 illustrates the graph of the











Figure 1. Production of Credit per Unit of Deposits, q￿
The solvency restriction that assets equal liabilities is given by
Ptqt + Mt = Ptdt: (2.12)
The liquidity constraint is that money withdrawn by the consumer is covered
by deposits:
Ptdt ￿ Mt: (2.13)
6When no credit is used, the liquidity constraint holds with equality and is equal
to the solvency constraint.
The intermediary￿ s competitive pro￿t maximization problem is the maximiza-
tion of the per period nominal dividends:
Max
lQt;sQt
RqtdtPt = Pqtqt ￿ wtlQthtPt ￿ rtsQtktPt; (2.14)
subject to the production function for qt in equation (2.10), or more simply with
normalized variables and with
Pqt





￿2 ￿ wtlqt ￿ rtsqt: (2.15)
The solvency and liquidity constraints in equations (2.12) and (2.13) are always
satis￿ed in this simple problem. Zero pro￿t results through the distribution of the
dividends according to the number of shares of bank ownership that the consumer
has, as given by the real quantity of deposits dt; at the dividend rate of Rqt:
The ￿rst order conditions can be written as in terms of average and marginal
products: with APlqt ￿
q￿
t
lq , APsqt ￿
q￿
t
sqt; and MPlqt ￿ ￿1APlqt; MPsqt ￿ ￿2APsqt;





























These Baumol (1952) conditions equate the marginal cost of credit funds to
the value of the marginal products of e⁄ective labor and capital in producing the
credit, the standard price theoretic conditions for factor markets; the marginal
products are fractions, ￿1 and ￿2; of the average products.
Proposition 1: The marginal cost curve is upward sloping for all ￿1+￿2 < 1;
and convex for ￿1 + ￿2 < 0:5:
































￿1 : Finally, substituting in for sqt from










































The graph of the marginal cost per unit of q￿
































Q ; is upward sloping for ￿1+￿2 < 1
since
1￿￿1￿￿2
￿1+￿2 > 0 for ￿1 + ￿2 < 1; and it is convex for ￿1 + ￿2 < 0:5; since
1￿￿1￿￿2
￿1+￿2 > 1 for ￿1 + ￿2 < 0:5:
In the equilibrium described below in Section 2.5, the MCt intersects with the
nominal interest rate Rt at the equilibrium quantity of credit output per unit of
deposits, q￿
t 2 [0;1); as Figure 2 illustrates (for ￿1 + ￿2 = 0:3, B = 1:3541 and
R = 0:15):






Figure 2. Marginal Cost of Credit per unit of q￿
t
2.3. Goods Producer Problem
The goods producer competitively hires labor and capital for use in its Cobb-








rt = (1 ￿ ￿)AG(lGtht)
￿(sGtkt)
￿￿: (2.21)
82.4. Government Financing Problem
The government money supply changes according to a lump sum transfer of cash,
Vt; given to the consumer each period:
Mt+1 = Mt + Vt: (2.22)
2.5. Equilibrium
Given prices rt; wt; Pt; Pqt; and Rqt; the consumer maximizes utility in equation
(2.1) subject to the exchange, income, and human capital investment constraints,
in equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.8), and (2.9), with respect to ct; xt; lGt; lQt; sGt;
sQt; qt; dt; kt+1; ht+1; and Mt+1. Given the prices rt; wt; Pt; and Pqt; the ￿nancial
intermediary maximizes the dividend in equation (2.15) with respect to normalized
inputs giving the equilibrium conditions (2.16) and (2.17). The goods producer
maximizes pro￿t subject to the CRS production function constraint (2.19), giving
the marginal product conditions (2.20) and (2.21). And the government￿ s budget
constraint (2.22) provides the market clearing condition for the money market;
the deposit condition (2.3) provides market clearing for the intermediary￿ s deposit
market; and goods market clearing of income equal to expenditure is given by
equation (2.9).
Equilibrium conditions along the balanced-growth path are given here for log-
utility, and used to describe how in￿ ation a⁄ects the equilibrium.
pqt = Rt; (2.23)




















1 + ~ Rt
wtht
; (2.26)
~ Rt = (1 ￿ q
￿








(1 ￿ xt); (2.28)
1 + gt =




1+ ~ Rt ￿ ￿K
1 + ￿
; (2.29)
The price of credit per unit is simply the nominal interest rate (equation
(2.23); thus the marginal cost of money equals that of credit. At the Friedman
optimum, the nominal interest R of equation (2.24) equals zero and no credit is
used in equation (2.25). But as in￿ ation rises, the agent substitutes from goods
towards leisure while equalizing the margin of the ratio of the shadow price of
goods to leisure, xt=(￿ct) =
h
1 + ~ Rt
i
=(wtht); in equation (2.26). Here ~ Rt; as
given in equation (2.27), is the average exchange cost per unit of output; this
equals the average cost of using cash, Rt; weighted by (1 ￿ q￿
t) and the average
cost of using credit, (￿1 + ￿2)Rt; weighted by q￿
t: That (￿1 + ￿2)Rt is an average
cost can be veri￿ed by dividing the total cost of credit production by the total
output of credit production. And this total exchange cost determines how much
substitution there is from money to credit, as given in equation (2.25), and from
goods to leisure. Substitution towards leisure causes a fall in the human capital
return of rHt ￿ "AH(sHtkt=lHtht)(1￿")(1 ￿ xt) , given in equation (2.28). The
marginal product of physical capital rt, in equation (2.21), also falls, while the
real wage wt in equation (2.20) rises, and there is a Tobin (1965)-type substitution
from labor to capital across all sectors in response to the higher real wage to real
interest rate ratio; the Tobin (1965) like rise in sHtkt=lHtht mitigates but does
not reverse the fall in the return to human capital rHt caused by the increase
in leisure. The growth rate, in equation (2.29), falls as Rt rises since both rHt
and rKt ￿ rt=
￿
1 + ~ Rt
￿
fall. As the in￿ ation rate continues to rise, the credit
substitution channel allows the growth rate to decline at a decreasing rate, as
more credit and less leisure are used as the substitute for the in￿ ation-taxed good
(Gillman and Kejak 2005).
103. Financial Development
An increase in in￿ ation causes more use of exchange credit, with a movement
along the marginal cost curve up to a new higher MCt. This can be viewed as
an increase in the scope of the credit production, with a given degree of ￿nancial
development; this is a wider use of ￿nance, rather than a deeper use, such as when
it is used for intermediating more investment. The e⁄ect of the degree of ￿nancial
development itself can also be identi￿ed.
3.1. E⁄ects of Financial Development on Marginal Cost
One interpretation of development is that there is a simple productivity increase;
applied to the ￿nance sector here, this would be given by an increase in AQ:
Another interpretation of development given in Lucas (2002) is that there are
greater returns to scale in a function with less than constant returns to scale;
applied to q￿ production function in equation (2.11), this would be given by an
increase in ￿1 or ￿2: Both of these parameter cause a shift in the marginal cost
curve, and impact upon growth.
Proposition 2. For a given level of q￿
t; an increase in AQ decreases the
marginal cost.
Proof: From equation (2.18), for a given q￿
t and (￿1 + ￿2) 2 (0;1]; it follows
that @ (MCt)=@AQ < 0:
Figure 3 graphs how an increase in AQ pivots down the marginal cost (dotted
line) from its baseline (solid line). In contrast, changes in the scale parameters ￿1
and ￿2 cause changes in the curvature of the marginal cost curve and in its level
for a given q￿
t:
Proposition 3. For a given w and r; an increase in ￿1 causes a decrease in
the curvature of the marginal cost curve, and second, causes an increase in the
level of marginal costs for a given level of credit output, given a su¢ ciently low
quantity of credit output.
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Figure 3. Marginal Cost with Changes in AQ and ￿
Figure 3 illustrates the proposition. For MCt = B (q￿)
(1￿￿)=￿ ; where B is given
by equation (2.18), it graphs an increase in ￿ from ￿ = 0:25 (solid line) to ￿ = 0:40
(dashed line), while B actually depends on ￿ and falls in turn in this example
from 1.73 to 0.94. For MCt = B (q￿
t)
(1￿￿)=￿; the increase causes less curvature
and a higher marginal cost for a given, su¢ ciently low, q￿
t. The proposition
indicates that a more ￿nancially developed economy has a less "curved" marginal
cost. It is convex for ￿ < 0:5, linear for ￿ = 0:5; and concave for ￿ > 0:5:
The marginal cost approaches a horizontal line for ￿ = 1; the lim￿!1MC = B:
It approaches a vertical one for ￿ = 0: Put di⁄erently, with a very ￿nancially
undeveloped economy, as when ￿ ￿! 0; credit is "constrained" in that the MCt
curve approaches a reverse-L shape (c).
12It is important to note that if ￿ = 1; then there is no third factor, deposited
funds, entering into the credit production function, and there is no equilibrium:
Proposition 4: Assume that ￿1 + ￿2 = 1; that both the credit sector and
goods production sector are equally labor intensive (￿1 = ￿). Then there exists
no equilibrium.
Proof: Please see the Appendix A.1.
The proposition shows the importance of deposited funds as a non-trivial fac-
tor: the marginal cost per unit of funds is upwards sloping, as in Figure 2 above,
and there is a unique equilibrium of credit supplied, and of money demanded, at
a given nominal interest rate.6
3.2. Interpretation of Economies of Scale
The economies of scale can be interpreted as the per unit cost of credit. Consider
that the total ￿nancial intermediary dividends returned to the consumer are Rqtdt:
In per unit of credit terms these dividends are Rqtdt=qt; denoted by R￿
qt ￿ Rqtdt=qt:
Proposition 5. The proportional per unit cost of credit is equal to the degree





=Rt = ￿1 + ￿2:
Proof. Since Rt = pqt by equation (2.23), then, by use of the CRS property
of the production function of equation (2.10),
wtlQtht
Rtqt = ￿1 and
rtsQtkt
Rtqt = ￿2. From
6The nature of the mixed equilibrium problem was put forth by King and Plosser (1984)
in terms of the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS) in ￿nancial sector production:
"The constant returns to scale structure implies that at given factor prices the ￿nance industry
supply curve is horizontal." This ￿ at marginal cost schedule competes against a similarly ￿ at
price of money, being the nominal interest rate, and there is no equilibrium. Baltensperger
(1980), in focusing on costly intermediation services, ￿nds that the production function must
be of decreasing returns to scale in capital and labor, or conversely that there needs to be
a convex cost function, so that the constant marginal revenue per unit of funds equals the
rising marginal cost per unit funds. Berk and Green (2004), in their study of mutual funds
intermediation, specify a convex cost function, as does Wang, Basu, and Fernald (2004) for a
variety of value-added bank services. Alternative approaches to this problem include Aiyagari,
Braun, and Eckstein (1998) and Li (2000). Relatedly, Lucas (2000) and Canzoneri and Diba
(2005) normalize their monetary transaction cost function by the quantity of exchange funds
(equal to output). For an aggregate output application in which less than CRS in normalized
labor and capital is central, Hansen and Prescott (2005) specify a third factor of production as
the number of production plants, with a normalization per unit of plants.
13equation (2.15), and using the de￿nitions above of lqt ￿
lQtht










t (1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2):
With the de￿nition above that R￿
q ￿ Rqt=q￿
t; then R￿
q = Rt (1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2); or
Rt = R￿





=Rt = ￿1 + ￿2:
The di⁄erential between the price of credit per unit of credit output, Rt; and
the dividend rate of return per unit of credit, R￿
qt; gives the average cost of the
resource use per unit of credit, (￿1 + ￿2)Rt: This makes the degree of the returns
to scale, ￿1 + ￿2; equal to the fraction of the nominal interest rate that are used
up by the costs per unit of credit, which is the basis for calibration in Section 4.
3.3. The E⁄ect of Financial Development on Growth
For the case of no physical capital, the analytic e⁄ect on growth of changes in
￿nancial development can be simply derived. With ￿ = " = 1; and ￿2 = 0;




qt : Using the equilibrium conditions, (2.23)-(2.28), the solutions for nor-
malized credit use, goods, leisure and the growth rate are given by q￿



















1+￿1AGq￿R (ratio of shadow price of goods to social cost of goods),
and ￿nally 1 + g =
1+AH(1￿x)￿￿H
1+￿ :
Proposition 6. With ￿ = " = 1; and ￿2 = 0; an increase in the credit sector
productivity level, AQ; causes an unambiguous decrease in leisure and increase in
growth.
Proof: From the equilibrium solution given above, it is clear that @q￿=@AQ >
0; and since ￿1 < 1 that @￿(R)=@q￿ < 0: With ￿H < 1; it follows that @x=@￿(R) >
0: Consequently @x￿=@AQ < 0; with @g=@x < 0; then @g￿=@AQ > 0:
This shows the intuitive result that greater productivity in producing credit
results in a higher balanced-path growth rate, for a given rate of money supply
growth. Increasing the degree of economies of scale gives the opposite result for
su¢ ciently low nominal interest rates:





￿1e￿(1￿￿1); an increase in ￿1 causes an increase in leisure x and a decrease
in the growth rate g; i.e. @x=@￿1 > 0 and @g=@￿1 < 0.
Proof: Please see the Appendix.
Intuitively, an increase in the normalized returns to scale of labor (and capital)
in credit production, while maintaining a given nominal interest rate, causes a
lower marginal cost per unit of credit output for a high level of credit output, but
a higher marginal cost for low credit outputs. The latter case results in less total
credit production, a more inelastic money demand, and more leisure because of
a greater use of the goods to leisure channel for avoiding in￿ ation, instead of the
money to credit channel for avoiding in￿ ation. More leisure causes less growth.
4. Investment Rate, Tobin E⁄ects, and Employment
The e⁄ect of in￿ ation and ￿nancial development on investment can be seen in the
full model with physical capital. To illustrate this, we calibrate the economy and
simulate the e⁄ects of in￿ ation on investment and growth and other variables,
and with the e⁄ects of changes in ￿nancial development also included. These are
presented below in Figure 4-8.
The benchmark calibration uses realistic values so that the simulations are
plausible. The parameter values are ￿ = 0:04, ￿K = ￿H = 0:1; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:64;
" = 0:8; ￿ = 0:13; ￿1 = 0:083; ￿ = 5; AG = 0:616; AH = 0:6; AQ = 1:31; and
￿1 + ￿2 = 0:13: The implied variable values are q￿ = 0:776; x = 0:64; g = 0:02;
￿ = 0:05; lG = 0:14; lQ = 0:0016; sG = 0:59; sQ = 0:007: Also residually we then
have ￿ = g + ￿ = 0:02 + 0:05 = 0:07; R = ￿ + ￿ = 0:11; h=k = 2:66, rH = 0:160;
lGh=(sGk) = 0:634, r = 0:166, w = 0:464. This is similar to the values used in
the literature, where applicable, and for the credit sector, to Benk et al (2007).
The basis for the calibration for ￿1+￿2 = ￿ is the interest di⁄erential formula
of Proposition 5, whereby ￿1 + ￿2 = (R ￿ Rq)=R: It is calibrated using ￿nancial
industry data at ￿ = 0:13. First note that the Cobb-Douglas function implies
15that Rqd = Rq(1 ￿ ￿) is the total dividend returned to the consumer (interest
dividend on deposits); this makes ￿Rq the resource cost of the credit. Per unit
of credit this is ￿R; so ￿ is the per unit cost of credit divided by R: To calculate
this, we use the M1 US average annual income velocity for 1972-2005, equal to
1/0:15; so q=d = q￿ = [1 ￿ (m=y)] = 1 ￿ 0:15 = 0:85: Then ￿=(total credit
cost)/Rd(0:85): For a rough estimate, we use for the basis the average annual fee
for a American Express credit card, for how much interest is paid on average; it
is assumed to re￿ ect the total interest costs of using the annual exchange credit,
also called a "charge card" rather than a roll-over intertemporal credit. For an
average person this is calculated as $170, comprised of the basic $125 Gold card
annual fee plus other ad-on charges of $45 such as for late payment penalties
and risk premiums for less credit worthy purchasers. Then ￿ = 170=Rd(0:85).
With GDP per-capita at 25127, at 2006 prices, then we set y = d = 25127;
and R = 0:0606 the 3-month Treasury Bill interest rate (annual basis), then
￿ = 170=[(0:0606)25127(0:85) ’ 0:13.
Using the calibrated values, instead of a general illustration as in Figure 1,
Figure 4 shows a cross-section of the equilibrium production of credit q￿ 2 [0;1)
in equation (2.11), graphed with respect to the lq axis and including the (2.15)
line. The equilibrium point (circle) shows where the marginal product of labor in
credit production equals the real wage divided by the market price of credit, R:













Figure 4. Equilibrium Credit Production
Figures 5-7 present the baseline simulation (solid lines) along with changes to
16the baseline (dashed line). The changes are a 5% rise in AQ; in Figure 5, from
1.31 in the baseline to 1.376, and a 20% rise in ￿; in Figure 6, from 0.13 to 0.156.






















Figure 5. In￿ ation, Growth, and Changes in AQ





















Figure 6. In￿ ation, Growth, and Changes in ￿













































Figure 7. In￿ ation vs Returns on Capital, Investment Rate, Capital/E⁄ective
Labor
The baseline simulation in Figures 5 and 6 shows that as the in￿ ation rate
rises, the balanced-path growth rate falls at a decreasing rate, for moderately
high in￿ ation rates. The comparative statics show this e⁄ect has less curvature
when AQ increases, with a higher growth rate for each in￿ ation rate, and more
curvature for an increase in ￿; with a lower growth rate for each in￿ ation rate.
Figure 7 shows how in￿ ation similarly a⁄ects other variables: the return on
human capital, rH; the investment to output ratio, i=y; and the return on physical
capital, rK ￿ rt=
￿
1 + ~ Rt
￿
all fall as the in￿ ation rate increases, at low levels of
in￿ ation; and the capital to e⁄ective labor ratio in goods production rises with
in￿ ation, at low levels of in￿ ation. The ￿rst two variables, rH and i=y; both
decrease nonlinearly as the in￿ ation rate increases, until the decrease approaches
zero and even starts to increase. Meanwhile rK falls and then rises as in￿ ation
18increase, and sGk=lGh; moves as a mirror re￿ ection in opposite of that of rK:: The
capital return rK and the capital to e⁄ective labor ratio sGk=lGh begin in￿ ecting
at lower in￿ ation rates, than do rH and i=y; because of the inclusion of investment
within the exchange constraint.
The Section￿ s last Figure 8 indicates that the rate of productively employed
labor, in the three sectors of goods, human capital and credit production, or 1￿x;
falls at a decreasing rate as the in￿ ation rate rises. This rate of employed time is
also what can be called the human capital utilization rate. It exhibits a similar
nonlinearity as seen for other variables.






















Figure 8. Employment Rate and In￿ ation
5. Discussion: Explaining the Evidence
Dri¢ ll (2003), Trew (2006), and Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005) for example,
describe many of the di¢ cult issues involved in determining how ￿nance a⁄ects
growth, and these can become more complex when bringing in the interaction of
￿nance with in￿ ation, for example as in Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998),
Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001), Rousseau and Wachtel (2001) and Rousseau and
Wachtel (2002).
5.1. Financial Development, Investment, and Growth
Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005), using VAR and VECM time series methods,
￿nd that ￿nancial development robustly is associated with increases in investment
19in several countries; this is consistent with the our model￿ s comovement of "￿nan-
cial depth" with the amount of investment, which results from our assumption
of no intertemporal intermediation cost. However, Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn
(2005) also ￿nd Granger causality from ￿nancial development to investment; to
show this we would need to model the intertemporal intermediation process ex-
plicitly, with a costly process (in addition to the existing costly exchange credit
intermediation). Then it would be clear that a decrease in the cost of such inter-
mediation would cause more investment to be intermediated.
Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005) categorize the e⁄ects of ￿nance on growth
into two channels. First, ￿ the "total factor productivity" channel operates through
innovative ￿nancial technologies￿(quotes in original). This exactly describes our
model￿ s increase in the AQ parameter, which causes an unambiguous increase in
growth. ￿ The second "factor accumulation" channel focuses on the spread of orga-
nized ￿nance in place of self-￿nance and the resulting improvement to the ability
of intermediaries to mobilize otherwise unproductive resources and help ￿rms to
overcome project indivisibilities￿(qoutes in original). This is ￿ts well a descrip-
tion of increasing economies of scale, which in our model is characterized by an
increase in ￿1 and ￿2: Their results indicate little e⁄ect of ￿nancial development
on output which they interpret, in combination with their investment e⁄ects, as
implying that ￿nancial development worked primarily through the factor accumu-
lation channel.
With panel data, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) ￿nd that ￿nance positively
a⁄ects growth only for low levels of the in￿ ation rate. Gillman and Harris (2004a)
and Gillman and Harris (2004b) ￿nd that ￿nancial development interacts with
in￿ ation and causes a negative e⁄ect on growth. Our model is consistent with both
of these results if at higher levels of in￿ ation the "factor accumulation" channel is
operative and the scale of the ￿nancial sector (￿1 or ￿2) is induced to increase with
a negative e⁄ect on growth that is su¢ ciently large to dominate any simultaneous
positive total factor productivity increases to AQ.7 At low levels of in￿ ation, if
7Other explanations of how the increase in exchange credit can cause lower growth rates can
20total factor productivity increases dominate any increase in scale, then the growth
e⁄ect of ￿nancial intermediation would be positive. This is plausible in that the
scale of operations might more likely remain relatively ￿xed when in￿ ation is
low and in￿ ation-tax avoiding demands on ￿nancial intermediation are less; then
total factor productivity increases can dominate the e⁄ect on growth. However,
in the model the ￿nance sector￿ s total factor productivity and scale economies are
exogenous, and so can only explain the evidence in a comparative static fashion,
for a given level of in￿ ation.
5.2. In￿ ation E⁄ects on Economy-wide Variables
In the model, with the extent of costless intertemporal credit intermediation
viewed as a measure of ￿nancial depth, in￿ ation causes a decrease in ￿nancial
depth at the same time as it decreases investment. This is consistent with Boyd,
Levine, and Smith (2001) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2001) who ￿nd empirically
that an increase in in￿ ation causes decreases in various measures of ￿nancial depth
that are related to investment;8 Boyd and Champ (2006) discuss this in a related
context. And in￿ ation decreases the growth rate in a nonlinear way as found
empirically and explained in Gillman and Kejak (2005). The employment rate
decreases in the same nonlinear fashion.
At the same time that the model can explain how in￿ ation decreases the
investment rate, the related ￿nancial depth, the growth rate, and the employment
rate, it also explains why the scope of ￿nance expands as an in￿ ation-avoidance
instrument, as in the evidence presented by Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998).
There they ￿nd that countries such as Israel experienced increases in the size of
their ￿nancial sector as the in￿ ation rate increased. Our model produces this in
be found in the literature: for example in Ireland (1994), transitionally, the in￿ ation-induced
investment of capital in producing ￿nancial intermediation is a diversion of resources that causes
a temporarily lower growth rate.
8A close relation between ￿nancial depth and investment is put forth in Boyd, Levine, and
Smith (2001) in the following way: "...as in￿ ation rises... the ￿nancial sector makes fewer
loans, resources allocation is less e¢ cient, and intermediary activity diminishes with adverse
consequences for capital investment."
21that the use of exchange credit rises, and money demand falls, as the in￿ ation
rate goes up. Thus the model can be viewed as explaining this phenomenon
by the substitution from intertemporal ￿nancial intermediation towards exchange
￿nancial intermediation when the in￿ ation-tax rises and decreases the return to
both human and physical capital.
In addition, the in￿ ation-induced decreased return to physical capital has been
found empirically in a series of papers (Ahmed and Rogers (2000), Rapach (2003),
Rapach and Wohar (2004)), and this has been viewed to be indicative of an
operative Tobin (1965) e⁄ect. In our model, in￿ ation causes a decreased return to
physical capital, and also a rise in the capital to e⁄ective labor ratio in all sectors,
since the ratio of the wage rate to the real interest rises. We view the capital to
e⁄ective labor increase as the key part of the Tobin e⁄ect: instead of the capital
stock rising as in Tobin, here in general equilibrium it is the capital to e⁄ective
labor ratio that rises.9 Thus our model is consistent with this positive Tobin
(1965) e⁄ect, even though it includes a Stockman (1981) exchange constraint that
causes an in￿ ation tax on investment.
In Stockman (1981), this constraint causes the capital stock to fall, which
is a reverse Tobin e⁄ect that occurs in a framework with no labor, leisure, or
endogenous growth, and so no reallocation from labor to capital as a result of the
in￿ ation tax causing substitution from goods to leisure. Within our framework,
the Stockman (1981) constraint is the reason why the investment ratio declines
when in￿ ation goes up, even as the real wage to real interest ratio rises, along
with the capital to e⁄ective labor ratio. So the extension plays a critical role in
the model￿ s ability to explain evidence that in￿ ation causes ￿nancial depth and
investment ratio to decline. Without the extension, the investment ratio rises
with the in￿ ation rate.
9Gillman and Nakov (2003) present US cointegration evidence of in￿ ation with the capital
to e⁄ective labor ratio, with Granger causality from in￿ ation to this input ratio.
225.3. Source and Pervasivenes of Nonlinearity
Rousseau and Wachtel (2001) speci￿cally identify nonlinear relations in the in￿ ation-
￿nance-growth nexus and consider these a challenge to explain. Our model shows
that this nonlinearity is not an isolated event. It is found in the e⁄ect of in￿ ation
on all variables. Its source is the demand for money that is residual from the
credit supply, since they are perfect substitutes in exchange. The demand for
exchange means a⁄ects the equilibrium through the marginal rate of substitution
between normalized goods and leisure, in equation (2.26). To see this, for sim-
plicity assume that ￿1 = ￿2; and ￿ = ￿1 + ￿2: As the in￿ ation rate goes up, the
shadow price of goods in equation (2.26), 1 + ~ Rt ￿ 1 + (1 ￿ q￿
t)Rt + ￿q￿
tRt; rises
but at a decreasing rate. This follows directly from the solution for q￿
t in equation
(2.25); in particular, @
￿
1 + ~ Rt
￿
=@Rt > 0; and @2
￿
1 + ~ Rt
￿
=@R2
t < 0: Therefore
the shadow price of goods rises and induces substitution toward leisure, but since
it rises at a decreasing rate, it induces a decreasing amount of additional leisure.
The pervasiveness of this nonlinearity in the model provides an explanation
of why the nonlinearity has been found empirically with respect to the e⁄ect of
in￿ ation on ￿nancial depth and growth. It also gives a foundation for ￿nding such
a nonlinearity in the empirical study of the other e⁄ects of in￿ ation, such as the
investment, Tobin e⁄ects and employment e⁄ects, although these nonlinearities
apparently have been little studied as yet.
The money demand itself, at the basis of the nonlinearity, is supported directly
by evidence. As the in￿ ation-induced substitution is less from goods to leisure, it
is more from money to credit, giving a rising interest elasticity demand for money.
Such Cagan forms have been veri￿ed as holding in international evidence both for
individual countries and for panel data (Mark and Sul 2003).10
Since the money demand is a residual of the credit supply, it is also important
that the credit supply evidence be supportive. The standard assumption in the
￿nancial intermediation services literature, coming from Sealey and Lindley (1977)
10This Cagan elasticity feature has been shown elsewhere in a related economy, in Gillman
and Kejak (2005) and Gillman and Otto (2007).
23and Clark (1984), is to assume constant returns to scale in labor, capital and
deposited funds. This form repeatedly has been supported empirically, back as
far as Hancock (1985).11
Now, since our model assumes this CRS feature, and this underlies the nonlin-
earity, the paper does not explain it per se. However it does show that with CRS
in only labor and capital, without deposited funds, there is no equilibrium. With
the third factor of deposited funds, then the normalization of the cost of credit
production in terms of units of deposited funds puts the marginal cost of credit
into the same units of the marginal cost of money. And it is this normalized mar-
ginal cost that is monotonically upward sloping, as a unique equilibrium requires,
and that forms the basis of the empirically consistent nonlinearity.
6. Conclusion
The theory of how in￿ ation interacts with ￿nancial development in the model
is novel. It contributes a perspective for interpreting empirical research into the
determinants of economic growth and other economy-wide variables. It explains
simultaneously ten di⁄erent empirical ￿ndings, how these ￿ndings are related
theoretically, and why a nonlinearity is systemic.
The model is an endogenous growth monetary economy in which in￿ ation
causes the investment rate to decrease. With the savings-investment interme-
diation process assumed to be costless, ￿nancial development is de￿ned relative
to the parameters of the production of exchange credit that enables in￿ ation-tax
avoidance. Similar to Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005), there are two channels
for change in ￿nancial development: the total factor productivity in the ￿nance
sector, and the degree of scale economies for normalized capital and labor in pro-
ducing exchange credit. An increase in the former causes an increased growth rate
while an increase in the latter leads to the opposite. We simulate how in￿ ation
causes investment, ￿nancial depth, and growth to decrease nonlinearly, while the
11For a recent example, see Wheelock and Wilson (2006).
24scope of ￿nance increases through greater in￿ ation-avoidance activity. The Tobin
(1965) e⁄ect is positive, as in evidence, even while the investment rate declines.
The money demand function of the model underlies the nonlinearities that are
present, and this function, in itself, is consistent with evidence in support of the
Cagan function; the ￿nancial intermediation production is also consistent with
empirical evidence.
An extension that makes costly the investment-savings intermediation process,
and that also made stochastic the model by introducing standard (goods produc-
tivity and money shocks) plus shocks to the intermediation sector, could poten-
tially be a platform for studying the e⁄ects from ￿nancial crises. And business
cycle e⁄ects might also be useful to examine, as in Benk, Gillman, and Kejak
(2007), but with a focus on investment. The deterministic framework makes for
perfect foresight which certainly does not apply. Episodes when in￿ ation was
clearly not expected would be better examined stochastically. In this sense the
paper only provides a suggestive framework for explaining what has been found
in longer run empirical studies.
A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1








; and with ￿1 + ￿2 = 1;
then 1 = AQ (lQtht=qt)
￿1 (sQtkt=qt)
￿2 : Using equations (2.11) and (2.25), it can be
shown that lQtht=qt = ￿1Rt=wt; and sQtkt=qt = ￿2Rt=rt; substituting these rela-
tions back into the previous equation, it results that 1 = AQ (￿1Rt=wt)
￿1 (￿2Rt=rt)
￿2 ;




￿￿2 : Substituting in for wt and rt from the equa-














: With ￿1 = ￿; the last expression becomes
R =
AG
AQ: With log-utility, the nominal interest rate is a constant independent of
the growth rate: R = ￿ + ￿ + ￿￿; which in general is not equal to
AG
AQ; giving a
contradiction. In the case when
AG
AQ = ￿ + ￿ + ￿￿; then there is no equilibrium
25since AG > 0 implies that R > 0; then equation (2.25) implies that qt = 1, which
violates that qt=dt 2 [0;1); derived by combining equations (2.2) and (2.3).12
A.2. Proof of Proposition 7
From the solution given in Section 3.3, 1 + gt =
1+AH(1￿xt)￿￿H


























































+ ￿1 log￿1 + ￿1 logAQ
(1 ￿ ￿1)
2 < 0




@￿1 > 0 and
@gt
@￿1 < 0 for R < R0:
With the additional assumption that AG = 0:616 and AQ = 1:31; as in the
calibration in Section 4, Figure 8 below graphs R0: It shows that the resulting R0
(curved line) is at hyperin￿ ation ranges, above 50% (straight line) for all convex
marginal cost of credit curves; that is for ￿1 < 0:5; R0 > 0:50: At the limit of
￿ = 1; R0 = 0:34 and so R0 > 0:35 for all ￿:






Figure 8. R0 Bounds of Proposition 7
12This proof is a version of that found in Braun and Gillman (2006).
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